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In the last decades, the neural correlates of consciousness (NCCs) have been explored
using both invasive and non-invasive recordings by comparing the brain activity elicited
by seen versus unseen visual stimuli (i.e., the contrastive analysis). Here, we review a
selection of these studies and discuss a set of considerations to improve the search for the
NCCs using the contrastive analysis. In particular, we ﬁrst argue in favor of implementing
paradigms where different perceptual outputs are obtained using identical visual inputs.
Second, we propose that the large disagreement in the ﬁeld -in terms of the dissimilar
neural patterns proposed as NCCs- is partially explained by the fact that different studies
report the neural correlates of different conscious processes in the brain. More speciﬁcally,
we distinguish between the perceptual awareness of a visual stimulus, associated to a
boost in object-selective neural assemblies, and a more elaborate process (contextual
awareness) thatwe argue is reﬂected in the ﬁring of concept neurons in themedial temporal
lobe, triggering a rich representation of the context, associations, and memories linked to
the speciﬁc stimulus.
Keywords: consciousness, NCCs, contrastive analyses, perceptual awareness, contextual awareness, physical
confounds
INTRODUCTION
When we see a picture of a person, our retinal cells transduce light
into electrical signals propagated through the brain, triggering a
cascade of neural processes that leads to the conscious percept
of the speciﬁc person we are looking at. The minimal neuronal
mechanisms that are jointly sufﬁcient to elicit a speciﬁc conscious
percept are known in the literature as the neural correlates of
consciousness (NCCs; Crick and Koch, 1990).
In order to empirically manipulate awareness, different meth-
odswere developed in thepast to render a stimulus invisible despite
retinal stimulation (Kim and Blake, 2005). For example, a brief
stimulus that is normally visible can become invisible if it is pre-
ceded or followed by a second one; a phenomenon called “visual
masking” (Enns and Di Lollo, 2000). With “Attentional Blink”
(AB), the perception of a salient target presented in rapid visual
serial presentation (RSVP) is impaired by the detection of a pre-
vious stimulus (Raymond et al., 1992). Similarly, when two clearly
different images are sequentially shown separated by a brief blank
interval, observers typically fail to detect the change in the images,
leading to a manipulation called “Change Blindness” (CB; Simons
and Rensink, 2005). These experimental manipulations have in
common that the stimulus is transient, i.e., it is presented for a
short period of time. However, other techniques allow inducing
lack of awareness even with prolonged retinal stimulation. For
example, during “Binocular Rivalry” (BR) two disparate images
are presented to each eye, causing a sequence of subjective per-
ceptual switches experienced by the observer, suppressing one or
the other image despite constant visual stimulation (Blake and
Logothetis, 2002). The main downside of BR is that the number of
subjective alternations, alongwith their duration and latencies, are
not under experimental control. This issue is absent in a similar
technique called “Flash Suppression” (FS) in which one image is
presented to one eye, and then is removed from visual awareness
by suddenly presenting another image to the other eye (Lansing,
1964; Wolfe, 1984). In the same line, Tsuchiya and Koch (2005)
introduced another manipulation, called “Continuous Flash Sup-
pression” (CFS), in which robust and prolonged interocular sup-
pression is achieved by presenting ﬂickering patterns to one eye.
Many previous studies have aimed at ﬁnding the NCCs by
combining these experimental procedures with different measures
of neural activity such as scalp magneto/electro-encephalography
(M/EEG; Dehaene et al., 2001; Sergent et al., 2005), functional
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI; Lumer et al., 1998; Portas
et al., 2000), intracranial EEG (Fisch et al., 2009; Gaillard et al.,
2009), and single-cell recordings in human (Kreiman et al., 2002;
Quian Quiroga et al., 2008) and non-human primates (Logothetis,
1998; Macknik and Livingstone, 1998). In general, the methodol-
ogy undertaken for this line of research is the contrastive analysis,
i.e., comparing theneural activity elicited by“seen”versus“unseen”
stimuli (Baars, 1993). However, possible drawbacks associated
to this empirical approach have been raised in the latest years
(e.g., Overgaard, 2004; Aru et al., 2012a). Complementary to these
observations, here we discuss a set of considerations to improve
the search for the NCCs using the contrastive analysis.
MANIPULATION OF THE PHYSICAL STIMULI
The ﬁrst step toward ﬁnding the NCCs is to select an experimen-
tal method (e.g., backward masking, CFS, etc.) to induce lack
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of awareness. A simple approach would be to implement this
manipulation only for a set of “unseen” trials and contrast the
results with a set of “seen” trials, where the manipulation is not
used. For example, in the case of CFS, this would imply compar-
ing the neural activity elicited during interocular suppression with
a dioptic control in which ﬂickering patterns are absent (Sterzer
et al., 2009; Kang et al., 2011; Axelrod et al., 2014). However, the
limitation of this approach is that the neural activity induced
by the manipulation (e.g., ﬂickering masks in the example of
CFS) is absent in the “seen” condition. Therefore, the contrast
between “seen” and“unseen” trials could be partially reﬂecting the
processing of different physical stimuli.
An alternative is to use a milder version of the manipulation
for the “seen” trials. This can be achieved, for example, by adding
different amounts of noise to the stimulus (Jemel et al., 2003) or, in
the case of CFS, by changing the contrast of the ﬂickering masks
(Kaunitz et al., 2011). But still, differences in low-level features
such as luminance, contrast, or spatial frequency can largely mod-
ulate brain activity (Scholte et al., 2009). In fact, it has been argued
that the ultra-fast detection of faces in natural scenes is partly
explained by such features (Honey et al., 2008). One way to reduce
these effects is by changing the perceptual ambiguity but con-
trolling for a certain number of low-level variables (Portilla and
Simoncelli, 2000; Willenbockel et al., 2010). This strategy ensures
that this particular set of variables (e.g., contrast, luminance, and
spatial frequency) do not explain differences in the neural activa-
tion between “seen” and “unseen” trials. However, the possibility
of a hidden low-level variable explaining the differences observed
in the neural activations cannot be ruled out.
In order to get rid of possible confounds introduced by the
physical stimuli, several studies have proposed to compare dif-
ferent perceptual outputs using identical visual stimuli (Sergent
et al., 2005; Quian Quiroga et al., 2008; Lamy et al., 2009; Aru
et al., 2012b; Navajas et al., 2013). The underlying idea is to
implement a manipulation that leads to ∼50% recognition per-
formance, and then to contrast the activity elicited by these two
sets of trials. The challenge, of course, is to ﬁnd an experimental
manipulation to be at the threshold of perception so that a certain
stimulus is equally likely to be recognized or not. For example,
Sergent et al. (2005) used the AB paradigm and compared “seen”
and “unseen” trials with other set of trials in which the stimu-
lus was absent. Several studies were successful in implementing
this approach to uncover the neural basis of visibility (Marois
et al., 2004; Sergent et al., 2005). But a challenge when using the
AB paradigm is the extremely large variability across individuals
(Martens et al., 2006;Willems et al., 2013). In general, due to inter-
individual differences (Kanai andRees, 2011), previousworks have
proposed to adjust the stimuli ambiguity on a subject-by-subject
basis (Fisch et al., 2009; Aru et al., 2012b; Navajas et al., 2013). For
example, Navajas et al. (2013) used a modiﬁed backward-masking
paradigm in which different degrees of zero-mean Gaussian noise
were added to the stimuli. Critically, the variance of the noise
was tuned across trials following a double-staircase procedure
(Cornsweet, 1962; Figure 1A). In this way, “seen” and “unseen”
trials were extracted from same noise levels, enabling a compar-
ison across different perceptual states but keeping constant the
physical stimulation.
Using the contrastive analysis with identical visual stimulation
allows ruling out physical effects that can otherwise contaminate
the comparison between conditions. Nonetheless, this approach
does not exempt the contrastive analysis from other possible con-
founds (e.g., Aru et al., 2012a). For example, previous efforts have
sought to dissociate the NCCs from the effects of attention (Tse
et al., 2005; Bahrami et al., 2007), conﬁdence (Sergent et al., 2005;
Li et al., 2014), unconscious processing (Lamy et al., 2009; Salti
et al., 2012), and introspection (Pitts et al., 2012; Fraessle et al.,
2014). Whether the neural correlates of these processes can be
entirely disentangled from the NCCs is still matter of extended
debate (Lamme, 2003; Block, 2005; Dehaene et al., 2006; Koch and
Tsuchiya, 2007; Kouider et al., 2010).
DIFFERENT CONSCIOUS PROCESSES IN THE BRAIN
DO DIFFERENT NCCS NECESSARILY CONTRADICT EACH OTHER?
In the last decades, vast empirical and theoretical efforts have
been yielded to unravel the NCCs. However, to date, there is little
agreement about the areas, timing, and mechanisms involved in
eliciting a conscious percept. As an example, our own work has
recently provided dissimilar evidence in terms of modulations by
awareness occurring at different times and in different areas: (1)
An evoked potential measured from the scalp in the OTC peak-
ing at ∼170 ms that predicts conscious face perception (Navajas
et al., 2013; Figure 1B); (2) Single-cell ﬁring at ∼300–400 ms
of highly selective neurons in the medial temporal lobe (MTL)
appearing only upon conscious recognition (Quian Quiroga et al.,
2008; Figure 2); and (3) A deﬂection in the local-ﬁeld potential
(LFP) preceding the ﬁring of MTL neurons that is present only in
recognized trials (Rey et al., 2014; Figure 2). To put together these
results into a coherent framework, we propose to distinguish two
different neural processes associated with conscious perception,
namely, perceptual and full awareness.
PERCEPTUAL AWARENESS IN OBJECT-SELECTIVE CORTICAL AREAS
The search for the NCCs has posed the problem of ﬁnding which
of the neural activations along the visual system correlate with
conscious perception (Crick and Koch, 1990). In this line, evi-
dence frompsychophysical (He andMacLeod,2001), physiological
(Gawne and Martin, 2000), and neuroimaging (Haynes and Rees,
2005) studies supports the notion that the primary visual cor-
tex (V1) is not directly involved in eliciting conscious percepts
(Crick and Koch, 1995; Rees et al., 2002). However, alternative
views about the role of V1 in visual awareness were also proposed
(Tong, 2003). In turn, object-selective responses in the inferotem-
poral cortex (ITC) have been consistently shown to be modulated
by conscious perception (for a review see Logothetis, 1998). Sim-
ilarly, an evoked potential in the 5 to 15 Hz frequency band at
∼170 ms was repeatedly shown to be modulated by conscious
perceptionusing the contrastive analysiswith identical visual stim-
ulation (Fisch et al., 2009;Navajas et al., 2013; Sandberg et al., 2013;
Figure 1B). Furthermore, conscious reports about face perception
can be decoded at the single-trial level based on the peak amplitude
of these evoked responses (Figure 1C).
In principle, this set of results showing correlations between
awareness and brain activity at 100–200 ms after stimulus onset
could be in conﬂict with theoretical proposals arguing that the
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FIGURE 1 | Neural correlates of conscious face perception. (A) Brief
ﬂashes of faces with different levels of Gaussian noise were presented
for 57 ms and combined with backward masking (mask duration:
443 ms). The noise level was tuned on a trial-by-trial basis following a
double-staircase procedure, i.e., the noise was increased after a “seen”
trial (blue dots) and decreased following an “unseen” trial (red dots). Trials
from the upper staircase (dark gray line) and lower staircase (light gray
line) were randomly interleaved. This method converges to a noise level
of ∼50%. Data from one participant of the experiment described in
Navajas et al. (2013). (B) Grand-average of scalp event-related potentials
(ERPs) elicited by “seen” (blue line) and “unseen” (red line) faces
obtained with identical visual stimulation. The electrode site (PO8) was in
the right occipito-temporal cortex. Three components are observed (P1,
N170, and P2); however, the only one that was signiﬁcantly modulated by
conscious perception is the N170. The shaded area around the lines
indicates SEM. (C) Decoding conscious reports with the single-trial N170
peak amplitude. Blue (Red) dots represent “seen” (“unseen”) trials in two
occipito-temporal electrodes (PO7: left hemisphere, PO8: right
hemisphere). The blue and red lines show the normalized distributions for
“seen” and “unseen” trials projected along the axis perpendicular to the
Fisher’s linear discriminant (black line). See Navajas et al. (2013) for further
details.
NCCs are reﬂected by “late” (>300 ms) activations (Dehaene
and Changeux, 2011). Alternatively, these neural modulations can
be regarded as pre-requisites of consciousness (Aru et al., 2012a)
occurring after stimulus onset (VanRullen, 2011), thus reﬂecting
a preconscious state (Dehaene et al., 2006). We believe that this
evidence supports the existence of a conscious process for visual
recognition, namely perceptual awareness, which is linked to a
boost in the activity of object-selective neural assemblies in high-
level visual areas. However, we do not claim that this is the only
conscious process in the brain. Instead, we propose that the role of
perceptual awareness is to rapidly recognize visual stimuli and to
feed this information to other neural circuits involved in different
cognitive functions. Among the subset of processes, we will focus
on one occurring in the MTL that is directly involved in memory
processes.
CONTEXTUAL AWARENESS IN THE MEDIAL TEMPORAL LOBE
Patients with pharmacologically intractable epilepsy, implanted
with intracranial electrodes for clinical reasons, provide the unique
opportunity to record, with the proper setup, single-cell activity
from the conscious human brain (for a review see Engel et al.,
2005). With these recordings, it was found that neurons in the
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FIGURE 2 | Single-cell and LFP responses in the human medial
temporal lobe. Example of a neuron in the right hippocampus
showing a spiking response to a picture of George W. Bush. Each
row in the raster plot is associated to one of the 30 recognized
trials. The vertical dashed line represents the onset of the spiking
response. The average LFP ﬁltered between 2 and 512 Hz is shown
in gray, whereas the one ﬁltered in the theta band (4–8 Hz) is
shown in red.
MTL respond to different images in a remarkably selective and
invariant manner. For instance, one neuron ﬁred to seven differ-
ent pictures of the actress Jennifer Aniston and not to other 80
pictures of other celebrities, animals and places (Quian Quiroga
et al., 2005). Moreover, these responses could be triggered not only
by pictures but also by the written name of the person and by the
name pronounced by a synthetized voice (Quian Quiroga et al.,
2009). Altogether, these results support the idea that the function
of these neurons is to provide an explicit and abstract represen-
tation of the meaning of stimuli, thus being called concept cells
(Quian Quiroga, 2012).
The latency of the ﬁring of concept neurons is about
300 ms, although parahippocampal cells ﬁre 50–100 ms before
(Mormann et al., 2008). This timing is consistent with a set of
“late” (>300 ms) activations that were shown to correlate with
access to consciousness (Del Cul et al., 2007; Dehaene and
Changeux, 2011). In this line, previous research has shown that
neurons in the MTL modulate their ﬁring activity with con-
scious perception (Kreiman et al., 2000, 2002; Reddy et al., 2006;
Quian Quiroga et al., 2008). For example, when two incongru-
ent pictures are presented to each eye, the ﬁring of these neurons
follows subjective perception (Kreiman et al., 2002). Similarly, in
a CB paradigm, Reddy et al. (2006) showed that concept cells
do not follow retinal input, as they were only active upon the
perception of the changes. Using a backward-masking paradigm,
previous research has also shown that concept cells ﬁre only when
the subject recognized the stimulus (Quian Quiroga et al., 2008).
Remarkably, the responses appear in an all-or-none fashion, even
if the visual stimuli were identical – i.e., the same picture at the
same duration (Quian Quiroga et al., 2008).
These studies provide critical evidence for asserting that con-
scious perception is accompanied by these neural responses in
the MTL. However, it was argued that this stage of processing
might reﬂect the consequences of conscious recognition (NCC-
co), rather than recognition per se (Aru et al., 2012a; Quian
Quiroga, 2012). This claim is supported by the fact that damage to
MTL structures does not impair conscious perception (Kensinger
and Corkin, 2000; Postle, 2009). Likewise, here we propose that
perceptual awareness precedes the ﬁring of concept cells and is cor-
related with neuronal ﬁring at 100–200 ms after stimulus onset,
probably in the ITC (Logothetis, 1998). Indeed, we believe that
a different and more sophisticated conscious process is triggered
when this information is propagated to the MTL, activating these
highly selective and sparsely ﬁring neurons that represent the
meaning of the stimulus for declarative, and particularly episodic,
memory functions (Quian Quiroga, 2012). In particular, we sup-
port the idea that full awareness of the stimulus is elicited by this
sensory-independent conceptual representation.
FROM RECOGNITION TO CONTEXT: A LINKING MECHANISM?
One of the most intriguing aspects of concept cells is the fact
that their mean ﬁring onset is too late (∼300 ms) to be explained
by direct projections from high-level visual areas (ITC). In this
line, it was argued that this delay might be crucial to enable the
integration of information from different cortical areas, giving
rise to a uniﬁed concept (Quian Quiroga, 2012). A recent study
has shown a global LFP deﬂection in the theta-band (4–8 Hz)
that precedes the response onset of concept cells (Figure 2) and
is present only when the stimulus is consciously recognized (Rey
et al., 2014). Moreover, the precise onset of concept cell responses
is characterized by an increase in phase locking between the spikes
and the LFPs in the theta band.
Even though the neural origin of this LFP deﬂection remains
unclear, we believe that it is not originated from within the MTL.
This is partially accounted by the fact that the human hippocam-
pus is not thought to produce substantial contributions to the
low-frequency LFP signals due to its structure (Buzsaki et al.,
2012). More importantly, since the theta activation was seen glob-
ally in the MTL, if it were generated within the MTL, single cell
activity responsible for this should have been observed prior to
the change in the LFP. However, this situation was not observed
(Rey et al., 2014). In turn, we hypothesize that this LFP response
may reﬂect an activation generated by reverberating activity in the
ITC crossing a certain threshold and triggering perception. This
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LFP would provide a temporal window so that perceptual infor-
mation can reach the MTL for further processes, such as memory
functions.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
This review discussed two methodological considerations in the
study of theNCCs. In particular, we ﬁrst argued for the implemen-
tation of paradigms where “seen” and “unseen” trials are obtained
through theuse of identical stimuli. Using contrastive analysiswith
identical visual stimulation allows ruling out physical effects that
can otherwise contaminate the comparison between conditions.
In the second part we discussed a selection of studies in which dif-
ferent NCCs were found at different timings and different brain
areas (Quian Quiroga et al., 2008; Navajas et al., 2013; Rey et al.,
2014). These seemingly contradictory results can be put together
into a coherent framework by discriminating two different neu-
ral processes associated with conscious perception (i.e., perceptual
and contextual awareness).
Interestingly, other distinctions between different conscious
processes in the brain were previously proposed (Block, 1995;
Kouider et al., 2010). For example, Block introduced the
dichotomy between“phenomenal”and“access”consciousness (for
a review, see Block, 2005), which is mainly centered on the ques-
tion of whether we can have cognitive access to all our perceptual
experiences, and thus whether we can see more than we can report
(Block, 2011, 2012; Kouider et al., 2012). In this review, we pro-
posed todiscriminate between twodifferent types of consciousness
for already perceived stimuli (that can be reported) – i.e., processes
beyond the distinction of phenomenal and access consciousness.
In particular, we distinguish between a type of consciousness that
relies on the ﬁring of concept cells (contextual awareness) and
the one that can be experienced even in the absence of MTL
structures (perceptual awareness). The most remarkable exam-
ples of perceptual without contextual awareness are provided by
patients with bilateral MTL resection or damage, such as patients
H.M. (Scoville and Milner, 1957), R.B. (Zola-Morgan et al., 1986),
and K.C. (Steinvorth et al., 2005). This condition led to a severe
impairment in recollecting autobiographical events with no tem-
poral gradient (Steinvorth et al., 2005), deﬁcits in imagining new
experiences (Hassabis et al., 2007), as well as in retaining and
retrieving any type of episodic memory (Moscovitch et al., 2005).
However, many other cognitive functions remained unaltered in
these patients, such as the recognition of faces encoded before
the surgery/accident (Kensinger and Corkin, 2000; O’Kane et al.,
2004). Altogether, this evidence indicates that the MTL is not
involved in the recognition of semantic entities, a process that
we propose to be triggered by object-selective cortical areas (per-
ceptual awareness). But bilateral damage or resection of MTL
structures prevents subjects from having an enriched represen-
tation of the context, associations, and episodic memories linked
to the speciﬁc stimulus, which we argue is elicited by the ﬁring of
concept cells (contextual awareness).
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